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Aristotelian Happiness
Paula Gottlieb
1. Introduction
 The Declaration of Independence hails the importance of “life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness”, but happiness conjures up many different types of life 
and pursuits, just as it did in Aristotle’s time. What then is the happiness that 
is appropriate to pursue and that lawmakers should be interested in? Is it simply 
whatever the particular individual happens to think it is, but in that case why 
should lawgivers pay any attention to it, especially if it does not harmonize with 
the good of others? (Consider someone like Hannibal Lecter, who, by his own 
lights is leading a very happy life.) On the other hand, if a person’s happiness 
is objective, but depends on external goods and factors that are beyond the 
individual’s control and are constantly changing, how can anyone pursue it? 
It looks as if we are blessed if it pursues us. As the Greek term for happiness 
“eudaimonia” implies, happiness will be like having a good daimon, a guardian 
angel, who shields us from disaster and brings us good fortune. Being happy will 
just be a matter of luck, which is the view of the ancient sage Solon. To escape 
the dilemma, Aristotle needs to show how happiness is both objective, not just 
whatever we think it is, and attainable by human endeavor. In the following, 
I shall explain how this is so on Aristotle’s account, and how the pursuit of 
happiness benefits the agent and other people too, in a way that should be 
congenial to enlightened legislators. A key idea will be Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean, a doctrine of Aristotle that has been denigrated as “false” (Immanuel 
Kant’s verdict), “true but uninteresting” (Bertrand Russell’s view) and “better 
forgotten” (the conclusion drawn by Bernard Williams).1 The doctrine of the 
mean has had such a bad press that even modern virtue ethicists who admire 
Aristotle, for example the “grande dame” of virtue ethicists, Philippa Foot, and 
Rosalind Hursthouse, have dropped it from their theories.2 I shall argue that the 
doctrine of the mean has some true and interesting implications for the problem 
at hand.
 First, a couple of comments about what happiness is. The ancient Greeks 
did not have plane flights or bottles of coke, but the following considerations 
may be useful. The place mat I was given on a recent flight showed a picture of 
a bottle of coke with the slogan “Open Happiness.” Perhaps this was supposed 
to conjure up the phrase “open sesame” and the magical, lucky daimonic aspects 
of happiness. Or maybe it meant that if you were to open the bottle and drink 
the contents you would get a happy feeling. But that would not be enough for 
the advertisers. They want you to get a happy feeling from drinking coke, not 
2
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 41 [2011], No. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol41/iss1/4
17   Paula Gottlieb
from drinking anything else. So perhaps it meant that if you opened the bottle, 
happiness would emerge in the form of a drink, or what Aristotle would call 
an external good, assuming the drink is good for you. It is a short step to the 
assumption that it is external goods that are decisive for happiness, as Solon 
thought.
2. Solon’s view
 Aristotle discusses Solon’s view in the context of the latter’s famous comment 
that one should call no person happy until that person be dead, a comment 
reportedly made in Solon’s legendary meeting with the proverbially rich king 
of Lydia, Croesus. Herodotus describes the encounter in detail in his History.3 
Croesus is visited by the wise Solon and takes his guest on a tour of all his 
treasures. Croesus then asks Solon who is the happiest man Solon has ever seen, 
expecting the answer to be himself. Instead, Solon points to a certain Tellus who 
grew up in a prosperous city, had good children and healthy grandchildren, died 
a fine death and was given great honor at his funeral. Obviously a bit peeved 
by that answer, Croesus asks for the second happiest man. Solon mentions two 
brothers, Cleobis and Biton, who had enough to live on and had great physical 
strength. They both won prizes in athletic contests, and, in a feat of superhuman 
strength, drew their mother in a chariot to a festival of Hera and were rewarded 
with death and statues dedicated to them at Delphi. Solon concludes with the 
more radical comment that “a human being is entirely chance”.4
 Two important points emerge from this discussion. First, Solon presents an 
objective account of happiness; just because Croesus thinks that he is happy does 
not guarantee that he is.5 Secondly, Solon does not dispute Croesus’s implicit 
view that treasures and what Aristotle would classify as external goods (goods 
external to psychological qualities), namely, strength, athletic prizes, children, 
grandchildren, good reputation and the like, are decisive for happiness. Instead, 
Solon notes that success in their regard may be fleeting, and the truly happy life 
is one that is successful throughout. (Solon even explains how the mother of the 
two men mentioned above actually prays that their lives should come to an end 
immediately upon the conclusion of their great feat, so that their lives would 
remain happy.)  According to Solon, one can have a happy life only if the whole of 
one’s life contains good things and if one dies in such a way that one is honored 
afterwards by those who survive. In short, on Solon’s view, happiness depends 
entirely on external goods and fortunes and external validation by posterity.
 What does it mean to say that no one can be called happy until dead? Solon’s 
comment combines two claims, first, that one should not call a person happy 
before that person is dead, and secondly, that one can call someone happy once 
that person is dead. Aristotle reasonably points out that Solon cannot mean 
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that someone could be happy after that person is dead, which would be absurd.6 
Therefore, argues Aristotle, Solon must mean that the person in question is now 
beyond good and bad fortune. But that, says Aristotle, is debatable: Since goods 
and bads exist for a person even if that person is not aware of them, they must 
also exist for a dead person, even if that person is not aware of them. As examples 
of goods and bads, Aristotle gives honors and dishonors, and successes and 
misfortunes of children and other descendants, precisely those things which Solon 
himself mentioned in praising Tellus, Cleobis and Biton. (A modern parallel may 
be the “legacies” that politicians become concerned about when they are about 
to leave, or have left, office.) This raises a further problem, because if someone 
becomes happy or unhappy whenever there is a change in the fortunes of his 
children, for example, the happy person will be as changeable as a chameleon. In 
effect, Aristotle is posing a problem for Solon—If the fluctuations in fortune are 
so great that we cannot safely call someone happy during his or her lifetime, why 
aren’t they equally great after death so that we should never call anyone happy?
 Aristotle does not want to answer this question by rejecting an objective 
account of happiness and assuming that only perceived changes in our experience 
affect our happiness. An alternative account is therefore needed.
3. Introducing virtuous activity
 Aristotle argues that Solon’s understanding of happiness is wrong because 
happiness does not depend solely on good or bad fortune concerning external 
goods. Although human beings need external goods for a happy life, “it is the 
activities in accordance with virtue that control happiness and the contrary 
activities that control its contrary”. In other words, we should not gauge a person’s 
happiness simply by looking at the ups and downs in that person’s fortunes, 
because these, unless very great, are not decisive. What happens to a person is 
less important than how the person deals with circumstances, through virtuous 
activity. The good person, he says, is not immune to bad luck, but will only be 
shaken from his happiness “by many great misfortunes, from which he will not 
become happy again in a short time, but if at all, in a long and complete one, by 
achieving many great and fine things” (EN I 11 1101a12-13). Therefore, according 
to Aristotle, it is reasonable to congratulate people on their happiness if they are 
virtuous, in anticipation of a continuing good life, and it is certainly possible to 
say whether they were happy once they are dead, when their happiness can no 
longer be decisively changed by acting virtuously or viciously.7  Therefore, Solon 
is wrong to concentrate solely on fluctuations in external goods in his account 
of happiness.
 What, then, is virtuous activity? On Aristotle’s account in book I of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, it is activity that expresses a virtuous or good character. (In 
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modern times, people tend not to talk so much of virtue and vice, but they do 
praise people for their good qualities and blame those who are jerks like Aristotle’s 
“mochtheroi”.) What is virtue? It is what makes for a happy life. In his discussion 
of Solon, Aristotle has not yet said what the virtues are. Just reading the passage 
about Solon, we might assume that Stoic virtues of endurance and perseverance 
would be most appropriate for dealing with the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune. On the other hand an “eat, drink and be merry because tomorrow we 
may die” attitude might also seem appropriate, not to mention the qualities of 
self-sacrifice and resignation. We need to know what the virtues are, according 
to Aristotle, to explain exactly what is missing from Solon’s account. What are 
the good qualities that make one live a happy life?
 Aristotle’s list of virtues runs as follows: courage (the virtue of having the 
appropriate fear and confidence and acting appropriately), temperance (having 
the correct disposition towards food, drink and sex), generosity (being disposed 
to give and also take in the appropriate manner), magnificence (which includes 
tasteful philanthropy), magnanimity (being correctly disposed to honors on a large 
scale), a virtue concerned with honors on a small scale, mildness (concerned with 
appropriate anger), truthfulness (concerned with telling the truth about oneself, 
which is also at issue in making truthful claims), wit (concerned with delivering 
and listening to jokes with appropriate targets), friendliness (a disposition relating 
to pleasing and objecting to others in general), justice (of which there are several 
types) and equity.8
 It is usual to complain that Aristotle’s list of virtues simply reflects the views 
and prejudices of his time, and are not based on any sound theory. One point 
against this view, as I argue in my book,9 is that half of Aristotle’s virtues are 
called “nameless”. Even though Aristotle uses names for them from the ancient 
Greek, these names do not quite capture the dispositions Aristotle has in mind. 
For example, truthfulness, according to Aristotle, relates to expressing the truth 
about one’s own abilities, and mildness may be expressed by someone who 
is quite angry, at the appropriate times. Aristotle even changes his own mind 
about what count as virtues. Truthfulness, friendliness and wit do not count in 
his (probably earlier) Eudemian Ethics, but they are upgraded in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. The addition of these to the cardinal virtues of courage, justice, wisdom 
and temperance, is an Aristotelian innovation.
 Is there a systematic explanation for what counts as an Aristotelian virtue of 
character and what does not? Commentators have tried to account for Aristotle’s 
list of ten virtues (and justice and equity), in various ways, without discussing 
the doctrine of the mean, even though Aristotle says that his list confirms the 
doctrine. But, as I mentioned earlier, the doctrine of the mean has received a 
bad press.
-
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4. The Doctrine of the Mean
 According to Aristotle each virtue is “a disposition involving choice in a mean 
relative to us” (EN II 6 1106b36), and each virtue is in a mean between two vices, 
one of deficiency and one of excess. As I argue in my book, Aristotle’s doctrine 
combines three ideas, the idea of equilibrium, the idea of relativity and the idea 
of triads. The first two ideas originate in ancient Greek medicine. A person is 
healthy when her bodily functions are in equilibrium. They can be thrown out of 
equilibrium in various ways. For example, too much or too little food and drink 
ruins health. Similarly, too much or too little exercise will ruin one’s strength, 
whereas the proportionate amount both produces and preserves it. The correct 
amount, explains Aristotle, is what is “relative to us”. Even though six is midway 
between two and ten, a trainer will not necessarily prescribe six pounds of food. 
That is because six pounds of food would be too little for Milo, the Chris Rock 
of the ancient world (he was six-time winner of the wrestling competition at the 
ancient Olympic games), and too much for someone new to the sport. Different 
amounts of food are appropriate for each. The author of the Hippocratic treatise 
On the Ancient Art makes similar points about relativity, noting that even among 
healthy people, different dietary habits may be beneficial. For example, some 
people have an adverse reaction if they miss lunch; others have an adverse reaction 
if they have lunch. Similarly, cheese is good for some people but bad for others. 
(They knew about lactose intolerance in the ancient world.)
 Aristotle’s application of medical ideas to ethics is controversial, but here 
is my interpretation. The good person’s character is balanced in a way that he 
or she has the rationally appropriate feelings in particular situations and acts 
accordingly. For example, the mild person will get angry at the appropriate time 
in the appropriate way for the appropriate reason &c. The courageous person will 
be appropriately fearful and confident in battle. Like an old-fashioned scales that 
registers the right weight of what is put in the pans, when correctly balanced, so 
the good person, having a balanced character, registers the appropriate emotions 
at the appropriate times and acts appropriately too. Aristotle also uses a musical 
analogy to illustrate his point. The good person’s character, like a well-tuned 
instrument, will sound the correct tones.10
 To understand the kind of ethical relativity Aristotle has in mind, we need 
to turn to his accounts of particular virtues. It is clear that he does not think 
that the relativity is relativity to what the agent happens to think, although the 
good person, according to Aristotle, is correct in her thoughts, feelings and 
actions. In this account of generosity, Aristotle argues that what’s appropriate 
to give is relative to the agent’s own means. What would be generous for you to 
give would be stingy for Bill Gates. In the case of magnanimity, a virtue relating 
to great honors, magnanimous people must have and use self-knowledge. The 
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magnanimous person must have the correct view of her own worth and abilities. 
The pusillanimous person has too low an opinion of herself. The vain person 
has too high an opinion, and will put herself forward for offices that she cannot 
fulfill. Thus, those who have the vices lack knowledge of their worth and abilities. 
The appropriate actions are relative to the agent’s worth and abilities.
 This brings me to the point of Aristotle’s triads. It is not that the vices 
necessarily exhibit too much or too little of what the virtue has, a point that has 
caused much confusion, suggesting that the doctrine of the mean is a doctrine 
of moderation, and a false one as Kant thought or a depressing one, as Bernard 
Williams suggests.11 The mild person, for example, is not moderately angry all 
the time, but will get very angry when the occasion warrants, and not at all when 
it does not. Furthermore, since there are indefinitely many ways in which one 
can go wrong, it has seemed perplexing why Aristotle picks out two rather than 
a myriad vices for each virtue. Certainly, picking out three shows that the dyadic 
way of thinking about virtue and vice is incorrect, but there ought to be more 
to it than that.
 There is. Aristotle picks out a virtue and two vices because there are three 
recognizable underlying psychological profiles involving self-knowledge. Just as 
the virtues are unified, in Aristotle’s view, so there is also unity among some of 
the vices. The coward, the pusillanimous person, the inirascible person, and the 
person who is indifferent to honor all underestimate their worth and abilities. 
The rash person, the vain person, the irascible person, the person who loves 
honor too much, and the buffoon all overestimate their worth and abilities. 
The coward’s inappropriate fear and lack of confidence in his abilities lead him 
to run from the battle. The person who is inirascible, and does not get angry 
when he ought when insulted, again has too low opinion of his abilities and 
worth. Similarly the person who is indifferent to all appropriate honors does not 
think himself worthy of them. Again, the rash person, who is over-confident, 
overestimates his abilities to succeed in battle, the vain person thinks he is owed 
all kinds of honors because he over-estimates his worth and abilities, as does the 
person who loves honor too much. The buffoon is full of himself and thinks his 
ability to make jokes is much greater than it is.
 The match is not perfect. Flattery (the excess vice relating to the virtue of 
friendliness) would seem to line up with the deficiencies, if the flatterer happens 
to be insecure, and the boaster (who has the excess vice relating to the virtue of 
truthfulness) may not be wrong about his abilities, but simply lying (although 
there is a question about whether a successful boaster needs to deceive himself 
too.)   Nevertheless, the triadic view shows why virtues are virtues and vices are 
vices in terms of three psychological mentalities. The doctrine of the mean is 
neither a doctrine of moderation, nor an empty doctrine after all. In fact, it 
entails a substantive conclusion about the type of qualities that will count as 
virtues. Dispositions like self-sacrifice, meekness and the like will not count as 
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virtues. Nor will the qualities that Thrasymachus of Plato’s Republic or Gekko 
of Wall Street thought were all-important, such as grabbing as much as possible 
for oneself. Though generated by the doctrine of the mean, the resulting virtues 
are good both for oneself and for others, especially for a good friend.
5. Self-love and friendship
 In introducing the virtues and vices, Aristotle describes them in ways that 
relate to the agent, rather than focusing on the impact these will have on other 
people, although many vices will obviously be harmful to others just as much as 
they are self-destructive. However, in his account of friendship Aristotle draws 
a direct parallel between the correct attitude towards oneself and the correct 
attitude towards another person, a friend, showing how the two go together. 
Here, he distinguishes two kinds of self-love, the kind where the agent gratifies 
his desires indiscriminately, in a way which lines up with the vices of excess, 
and the good kind of self-love where the person gratifies himself in ways which 
lead to virtuous activity. Here Aristotle is explaining that good self-love is not 
the same as selfishness. The correct way to treat a friend is to love him the way 
one would oneself when one loves oneself in the correct manner. Presumably, 
Aristotle does not include the vices of deficiency here, because they are hardly 
describable as a form of self-love.
 Friendship, in Aristotelian parlance, covers a variety of relationships: between 
friends, lovers, family members and, in the case of civic friendship, other citizens. 
Aristotle distinguishes three types of friends, friends merely for mutual advantage, 
friends merely for pleasure, and friends of good character. Only the good person 
will have the correct attitude towards her friend, and a friend, most significantly, 
is the greatest external good, according to Aristotle.12 According to Aristotle, 
only those of good character can be true friends, and true friendships are more 
fulfilling than friendships merely for mutual advantage or for pleasure, although 
friendships based on good character will be useful and pleasant too. Aristotle’s 
conclusion that friendships based on good character are best follows from the 
objective nature of happiness. The good person knows what is really good and 
wishes herself what is really good  accordingly. Since she knows what is really 
good she will wish her friend what is really good too. Good friends, according to 
Aristotle, reciprocate their good-will, are aware of each other’s good-will and also 
share many activities.13 Good friends, then, will not be enablers; they will help 
their friends when they can, and, since they have all the virtues, will be witty and 
amusing too. The virtuous person will be trustworthy and reliable, not changing 
her mind about important things from one day to the next. The virtuous person, 
then, will be the greatest external good for others, and contribute most to the 
happiness of her friends.
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 41 [2011], No. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol41/iss1/4
23   Paula Gottlieb
6. Solon and the greatest external good
 According to Solon, as portrayed by Aristotle, continuous external goods and 
strokes of fortune are all-important for the happy life. Aristotle argues that with 
or without a large amount of external goods, virtuous activity is more important. 
Having the virtuous disposition relating to wealth (generosity) or to honor 
(magnanimity and the virtue concerning honors on a small scale), is much more 
important than merely having wealth and honor, and virtuous activity is especially 
important in ensuring one’s ability to enjoy the greatest external good, a friend of 
good character, because only good people can have genuinely good friendships. 
This does not mean that external goods are unimportant on Aristotle’s view. 
Aristotle argues that the good and happy person requires a moderate amount of 
external goods, and, as we gave seen, a good friend is the greatest external good 
one can have. Aristotle does not believe that one can be happy in the direst of 
circumstances, for example. He does not have the view that virtue is sufficient for 
happiness. He merely disagrees with Solon that external goods are all one needs 
to be happy. But if someone like Solon can begin to see the value of a friend of 
good character as the greatest external good, he can perhaps be brought to see 
that virtuous activity should be included in an account of happiness.
7. The pursuit of happiness
 Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics with the comment that his inquiry 
is “tis politike”, a sort of politics. Happiness is the goal of the legislator as well as 
of the individual. Aristotle’s account of happiness, especially his doctrine of the 
mean, relates to the agent and his or her dispositions, rather than the outcome of 
having those dispositions. As we have seen, however, an important implication of 
Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is that Aristotelian happiness is good both for the 
agent and for others, and so should be something a legislator would have reason 
to promote. While the virtues (courage, generosity, friendliness, truthfulness and 
the rest) are obviously helpful to others, the vices are often harmful to others 
as well as to oneself. For example, people who are vain and put themselves 
forward for high offices when they are ill-suited to carry them out, will do harm 
to the people they serve. Similarly, people who are rash will do much harm to 
themselves and others who follow them into battle. Pusillanimity, the vice of 
those who think that they are not worthy of high office when they are, with its 
attendant lack of self-esteem, is harmful to the agent and as well as to others. So 
it is in the interest of the legislator to see that people are able to pursue a happy 
life through the virtues, both for their own benefit and for the benefit of others, 
and it is also in their interest to provide an education that goes beyond the mere 
acquisition of the inanimate external goods. Such an education, as Aristotle 
-
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argues in the central books of his Nicomachean Ethics, requires people to think 
for themselves, and also to practice what they think. In my book I coin the term 
“metalog mentality” to describe the mentality of those whose virtues of character 
involve thought and who, at the very least, do not merely parrot the thought of 
others. Without psychological dispositions informed in this way, external goods 
will be of limited use. In short, you cannot “open happiness” simply by ordering 
a bottle of coke.14
  University of Wisconsin--Madison
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Notes
1 See Kant Doctrine of Virtue 163, Russell 1930, Chapter 16, and Williams 1985, 36.
2 Foot 1978, 2001, and Hursthouse 1999.
3 See Herodotus History I. 30-33 and White 1992, Part II, especially 60-68.
4  Solon also notes that although a rich man may do best at coping with disaster, 
a lucky poor man will fare even better. For present purposes I leave this issue 
aside, although each may do better with good Aristotelian friends.
5  Herodotus’s readers would have known that Croesus came to a bad end, when 
he misinterpreted the oracle and brought about the end of his empire.
6 Solon and Aristotle are therefore not assuming the existence of any afterlife.
7  It is controversial what Aristotle’s conclusion is, because he uses rhetorical 
questions (EN I 10 1101a14-16). However, his final, non-rhetorical comment that 
the blessed, i.e., happy individual is the person who has and will keep the goods 
he has, supports my interpretation of the role of virtue (EN I 10 1101a16-20). 
I assume that “blessed” and “happy” are interchangeable here.
8  These final virtues and the virtues of thought are beyond the scope of this paper.
9 References are to Gottlieb 2009, especially Chapters 1, 2 and 4.
10  The fact that murder is always wrong is no counterexample to the theory. The 
term “murder” is only given to killing in the wrong situations, at the wrong 
time &c. See EN II 6 1107a9-17.
11 See Kant Doctrine of Virtue 163 and Williams 1985, 36.
12  Perhaps Aristotle is not speaking in his own voice when he describes honor as 
the greatest external good in his discussion of magnanimity (EN IV 3 1123b20).
13  Must good-will be reciprocated or can one merely be “a friend to” someone?  This 
is a difficult topic, but Aristotle describes the advantages of being a benefactor 
in EN IX 7. Thanks to Georges Dicker for raising this (and other) questions.
14  Thanks to Georges Dicker, as well as to Julie Ponesse, Gordon Barnes and their 
students for v. helpful discussion.
25   Paula Gottlieb
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